A fervid Trump supporter and self-described 1/6 participant by the name of Matt Cloud (who believes Democratic Senator Patrick Moynihan was a KGB “mole” and that he may even have been the same person as CIA Deputy Director John N.
Does your belief that Democratic Senator Patrick Moynihan, and/or Deputy Director of the CIA, John N. McMahon, were KGB "moles" or bad guys have anything to do with your being a fervid supporter of Donald J. Trump and a self-described 1/6 participant?
This "thread" is about the occasionally misinformed espionage writer known as Joe Trento and how he correctly reported in 1978 that the FBI had finally (correctly) determined that Hoover's shielded-from-CIA source, FEDORA, was actually a KGB-controlled triple agent who, among other things, had misled Hoover and Nixon into believing that the Kremlin had a *complete* set of the Pentagon Papers, which disinformation led to Nixon's forming The Plumbers Group (to determine the source of the leak), and which counterintelligence-kinda-search eventually led to the Watergate Break-In (involving someone whom John M. Newman claims, based on other evidence, was a KGB "mole" -- James McCord) and to Nixon's downfall.
Question: Can you prove that the Kremlin received a *complete* set of the multi-volume "Pentagon Papers" before The Washington Post (or was it The N.Y. Times?) published its shocking excerpts and analyses?
"Clearly electoral considerations are now believed to have a significant influence on U.S. foreign policy. This factor, according to Pakhomov, played a key role in the passage by the Congress of the Tunney Amendment which cut off U.S. military aid to Angola. The fact that 1976 was an election year, he writes, a period "when public opinion is of 'great significance' for the politicians" had "a serious influence on the decision adopted by the legislators."[97] Soviet analysts have apparently learned that, whatever the teachings of Party doctrine, the formal requirement of winning periodic elections can and often does affect the behavior of U.S. government officials.Elections, however, are not the only channel through which public opinion can make its influence felt. As the institute's Deputy Director, V. V. Zhurkin has recently observed, "the public . . . has no few opportunities to exert a sobering influence" on U.S. foreign policy. "This was very graphically revealed," he notes, "during the mass movement against aggression in Vietnam which unfolded in the United States during the late sixties and early seventies."[98]The anti-war movement, writes Zhurkin, had a major impact on American political life. "This was, in terms of scale, the most powerful campaign for stopping aggression in the history of the United States."[99] It united practically all the major anti-war organizations into a broad public front and directed their activity toward one goal—ending the war. It successfully coordinated its efforts with anti-war campaigns in other countries. Further, it developed many new "means of struggle"—"the "teach-in," the "sit-in," mass burnings of draft cards, boycotts of corporations which "profitted" from the war, etc. As a result of these efforts, the anti-war campaign was by 1967–68 transformed into a nationwide movement. Between 1969 and 1971 millions participated in mass protests against U.S. "interventional" policies in Southeast Asia.[100]These nationwide demonstrations, notes Zhurkin, had a profound effect on the American government. They "gave rise to growing anxiety" within U.S. leadership circles and "split their ranks." Further, "they prodded Congress into putting forth more decisive demands to stop the war and compelled official Washington to maneuver, to seek a compromise." The Pentagon Papers , suggests Zhurkin, provides evidence from "the inside" which shows "how in practice the anti-war movement exerted influence on the leadership of the military and the whole U.S. state machine." As the authors of the report indicate, "unhappiness with the war" and the growth of "public criticism" generated doubts within the government as to the wisdom of military escalation in Vietnam. Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, notes Zhurkin, in a secret memorandum of February 1968, "warned that continued escalation will lead to 'growing dissatisfaction,' 'evasion of military service and disorder in the cities' and in the end could lead to an 'internal crisis of unprecedented proportions.'" The contents of these secret documents, writes Zhurkin, "graphically demonstrate how powerful and effective was the pressure of social forces on the government."[101]Thus it was fear of public indignation, he argues, which "forced" leading government officials to modify their policies. Not only did such public pressure compel President Johnson to quit the American political arena, and President Nixon to withdraw U.S. forces from Indochina and finally in January 1973 to sign the Paris Peace Agreement. It was dread of a new wave of public protest which, according to Zhurkin, deterred Washington from again resorting to force when in the fall of 1975 the Saigon regime in South Vietnam collapsed.[102]"
...
"In light of its "constructive and businesslike approach" to the Soviet Union, the Nixon administration won recognition, in Arbatov's phrase, as an "acceptable partner."[109] The perspicacity and judiciousness of its leadership was—and continues to be—applauded. Thus, in an article in the main theoretical journal of the Soviet Communist Party, IMEMO Director Nikolai Inozemtsev gives "due credit . . . to a number of eminent state leaders of the capitalist world" who have recognized the dangers of "continuing the cold war and the harsh confrontation with the socialist countries" and "agreed to definite compromises" with them "in the interests of maintaining peace."[110] For Soviet spokesmen this is clearly the cardinal issue. Whatever their specific attitude to particular issues, the "realism" of American policy makers, that is to say their willingness to accept the "legitimacy," "viability" and "full equality" of the USSR, is an absolute prerequisite to "normal" relations."
l. On 12 April, I reviewed SB/[deleted] holdings (news clips and Agency memoranda) on the alleged delivery of the Pentagon papers (sic) to the Soviet Embassy in Washington. None of these papers are SB [Soviet Bloc] originated documents, but they show that:
a. On 4 June 1971 Chief SB [David E. Murphy] reviewed the clips and the related memoranda.
b. A blind memorandum (possibly prepared by CI Staff) bears the handwritten notation, "1 July 1971, written for the DCI's briefing book." It describes the FBI source and background to the report.
. . . . . . .
My comment: That "FBI source" was triple-agent KGB Major Aleksei Kulak (Hoover's shielded-from-CIA FEDORA) whom General Gribanov had sent to the FBI's NYC field office in early 1962 to "volunteer" to spy for it at the U.N. and who had misled the CIA and the FBI into believing that KGB Colonel Valery Kostikov (perhaps you've heard of him?) at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City was the head of KGB assassinations and sabotage in the Western Hemisphere.
I was more interested in Dimitri Simes' report, on p. 4.
"At a date that [SIMES] can no longer remember, Aleksandr Rodionovich BRYCHKOV (201-0809408) (Senior Research Fellow, Section of Political Problems of the Anti- monopoly Struggle at IMEMO) IMEMO's Division of International Relations, headed by Vasiliy Mikhaylovich KULISH (201-0864696), was analyzing "very important" American papers.
2. Sometime thereafter, when Jack ANDERSON began the public exposure of the Pentagon Papers and the New York Times began publishing them, Stepan Stepanovich SALICHEV (at that time the head of BRYCHKOV's Section of Political Problems of the Antimonopoly Struggle), "we (IMEMO) were well prepared" before the Times commenced publication. That remark led to speculate that it was the Pentagon Papers that the KULISH group was analyzing.
Sergo Mikoyan, The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis: Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Missiles of November (Stanford: Stanford University Press/Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012).
Doesn't Sergo know that, as indicated by Nosenko's questioning Tennent H. Bagley and George Kisevalter about an ostensible Indonesia military attaché by the name of "Zepp" in June 1962, Penkovsky was betrayed (IMHO by CIA's Kisevalter or Leonard V. McCoy, or MI5's Roger Hollis) within two weeks of his recruitment by the CIA and MI6 in April of 1961?
(You can read about "The Zepp Incident" in my Wikipedia article on Bagley and in the edited-by-me article on Yuri Nosenko.)
I don't know what Sergo knew. I do know that you cannot write coherently. Is this you?
"The "Zepp" Incident
Former high-level CIA counterintelligence officer Tennent H. Bagley wrote in his 2007 Yale University Press book, "Spy Wars: Moles Mysteries and Deadly Games," that Penkovsky's treason was detected by the KGB within two weeks of his April 1961 recruitment by the CIA and MI6. Bagley says that after this detection, Penkovsky was allowed by the KGB to continue spying for the U.S. and Britain for sixteen more months while a scenario was created in which he could be arrested and charged in such a way that would not reveal who, in Western Intelligence, had betrayed him. Bagley based his conclusion on the fact that, when Greville Wynne and Penkovsky were arrested, and imprisoned in Russia, Wynne was confronted with a tape recording of a conversation he had had with Penkovsky in a Moscow restaurant two weeks after his recruitment. In this recording, Wynne asked Penkovsky, "How's Zeph?" When Wynne was asked by his KGB interrogator who this "Zepp" (sic) was, he recalled that "Zeph" was the nickname of a London bargirl by the name of Stephanie, whom Penkovsky and Wynne had met while Penkovsky was being recruited. Bagley points out in his book that while he and George Kisevalter were interviewing KGB defector Yuri Nosenko in June 1962, Nosenko, while bragging about the KGB's secret recording devices, asked them who "Zepp" (sic) was, volunteering that it was the name of an Indonesian military attaché unknown to the KGB, whose conversation with U.S. military attaché Leo Dulacki was allegedly secretly recorded in a Moscow restaurant. The fact that Nosenko asked Bagley and Kisevalter this question was one of the reasons Bagley came to conclude that Nosenko was a false defector, and also made him realize that a "mole" in the CIA or British intelligence had betrayed Penkovsky immediately after his recruitment."
All of this is meaningless. The point, my point, was that in response to your observation about the additional redaction, the redacted portion would lead to Mikoyan and then on to the Mole issue. All of your contorted bloviating speculations are neither here nor there. We both agree that persons were given up. Your parenthetical conclusions aside, you have nothing.
You need to undertake an English writing course. You cannot write. To wit:
"Bagley points out in his book that while he and George Kisevalter were interviewing KGB defector Yuri Nosenko in June 1962, Nosenko, while bragging about the KGB's secret recording devices, asked them who "Zepp" (sic) was, volunteering that it was the name of an Indonesian military attaché unknown to the KGB, whose conversation with U.S. military attaché Leo Dulacki was allegedly secretly recorded in a Moscow restaurant. The fact that Nosenko asked Bagley and Kisevalter this question was one of the reasons Bagley came to conclude that Nosenko was a false defector, and also made him realize that a "mole" in the CIA or British intelligence had betrayed Penkovsky immediately after his recruitment."
Editor’s Note: This article was adapted from a paper that the author prepared for a symposium at Princeton University titled “CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991.” The symposium, held in March 2001, was sponsored by the Center of International Studies at Princeton and the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence.
The main purpose of this article is to examine the system that governed
the flow of information to senior policymakers in the USSR. Fundamental cultural differences between the Soviet and Western worlds have impeded efforts by Westerners to fully understand this system. It is much easier for those who were born and educated in the Soviet Union, and have spent much of their lives there, to comprehend the main features that dominated the upward flow of information in that now-defunct nation.
Culture of Secrecy
The “culture of secrecy,” a phrase used by former Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan in discussing US intelligence institutions, is actually what I would call a perfect characterization of the old Soviet Union’s attitude toward information.
Moreover, you are are constantly under test by me. You don't seem to get this. I throw in gold and chicken feed together, and watch as you gobble up the dust.
President and CEO, The Center for the National Interest
Born in: Russia
Dimitri Simes
Dimitri Simes was born in 1947 in Moscow in the former Soviet Union and graduated from Moscow University. Though he served as an analyst of international affairs at the IMEMO institute, he decided to immigrate to the U.S. in 1973. Here he was able to write insightfully about the Soviet government that he knew firsthand, including its foreign policies. This authority made him invaluable as an informal foreign policy advisor to President Nixon with whom he traveled to Moscow around the fall of the Soviet Union. Since then Simes has served as President of the Nixon Center and is currently president and CEO of the Center for the National Interest. He is the author of After the Collapse: Russia Seeks Its Place as a Great Power and has lectured at the University of California Berkeley and Columbia University.
Is the fact that your boy Simes was mentioned more than a hundred times in the Mueller Report just an example of the “Deep State” / “Administrative State” in action?
O’Donnell has been hosting “The Last Word” since 2010 and has been an MSNBC analyst since 1996. The Harvard graduate was an aide to the late New York Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan and an executive producer on the NBC entertainment series “The West Wing.”
"FBI Says Its Spy in KGB Was a Fake; FBI Thinks Its KGB Spy Was Always on Soviets' Side"
By George Lardner Jr
September 3, 1981 at 1:00 a.m. EDT
My comments are in brackets.
. . . . . . .
When the Nixon administration was in court a decade ago in an effort to cut off publication of the Pentagon Papers, the White House was told that a complete set of the top-secret documents had been delivered to the Soviet Embassy.
The FBI and the Nixon White House were evidently convinced that the report was accurate. It had come from "Fedora" [KGB Major Aleksei Kulak], a strategically placed KGB officer whom the FBI had been relying upon for years as a trusted counterspy.
The information he provided in this instance helped prompt formation of the infamous "White House plumbers" unit whose operatives later carried out the Watergate break-in. President Nixon's efforts to curtail the Watergate investigations were said to have been motivated in part by fears that "Fedora" would be exposed.
It might have been better if he had been. The FBI is now convinced that "Fedora" was a Soviet agent, acting under Moscow's control during all the years he fed information to the bureau.
The startling new assessment of "Fedora," until now a closely held secret, is disclosed in a forthcoming article in the October Reader's Digest and has been confirmed independently by The Washington Post.
The secret conclusion was based "to some degree, on new information," said one official familiar with the FBI's counterespionage effort. "It's an incredible business . . . an incredible chess game that you have to play."
The new finding about Fedora, who was stationed at the United Nations as a Soviet diplomat, also raises unsettling questions about the credentials of other supposed Soviet defectors, especially those whose stories Fedora backed up.
"If one falls, others must fall," contends the Digest article by roving editor Henry Hurt, "creating havoc inside intelligence services where crucial analyses and long-term plans may have been built upon the supposed reliability of these sources."
The case has all sorts of permutations. Much of the fallout concerns Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, a onetime [putative] KGB officer who has been a bone of contention since he defected to this country in 1964 with claims that he had been in charge of the KGB file on President Kennedy's assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald.
[False defector] Nosenko, who first offered to spy ["in-place" in Moscow] for the United States in 1962 [but who was really sent to the CIA in Geneva to discredit what a recant true defector, KGB Major Anatoliy Golitsyn, was telling the CIA, and who, regardless, told the CIA to not try to contact him in Moscow], had once said he would never defect, but then told his CIA contacts in Geneva in 1964 that he had to defect at once because he had received a cable [he hadn't] from Moscow recalling him. He said he was afraid the KGB had learned of his contacts with the CIA.
From his post within the Soviet apparatus at the U.N., Fedora offered confirmation, telling the FBI that Nosenko had indeed been sent a recall telegram.
Nosenko also claimed to have been a lieutenant colonel in the KGB. Fedora, who had been providing information to the FBI since 1962, confirmed that claim, too.
Subsequently, however, Nosenko acknowledged under hostile questioning by CIA officers that his talk of a recall telegram had been a lie and so was his claim of colonel's rank. He had been only a KGB captain and had lied, he said, to exaggerate his importance.
Before long, Nosenko found himself imprisoned by the CIA for some five years, three of them in solitary confinement [I'm sobbing uncontrollably], but he never broke down [he came really, really close one time] and was finally rehabilitated [sic; "cleared" by probable KGB "mole" Bruce Solie via a bogus polygraph exam and a specious report] in 1968. He became a consultant for the agency, collecting some $500,000 over the next decade in consultant salaries, bonuses, resettlement expenses and other payments [gag me with a KGB spoon].
Fedora, by contrast, appears to have had nothing but smooth sailing with the FBI despite his corroboration of Nosenko's admitted lies.
"When we started up with Fedora, the bureau held very strong views that he was legit," one former intelligence official recalled yesterday. "Of course there was a minority that felt the other way, but not many."
Much of what Fedora said over the years was, in turn, conveyed directly to the White House, enhancing his position, sources said. "There is no question the information would always go to the highest levels," said one expert. "That gave it a great deal of prominence."
By the time of the Pentagon Papers incident in 1971, editor Hurt said in a telephone interview, Fedora was "regarded as a knight in shining armor. And he was telling the FBI which was telling Nixon that a copy of the Pentagon Papers had been delivered to the Soviet Embassy. Nixon & Co. accepted the report without question."
In fact, word of the alleged delivery was quickly published by a conservative columnist with close ties to the White House while the Pentagon Papers case was still before the Supreme Court. Some critics regarded it as a White House effort to influence the court's decision, albeit an unsuccessful one.
In any case, according to a Dec. 9, 1973, New York Times article, President Nixon developed fears, reportedly nourished by his then-national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger, that Daniel Ellsberg, the man who had leaked the Pentagon Papers to the press, might have provided the Soviets with far more important secrets, especially concerning nuclear targeting plans.
Some intelligence officials were reportedly stunned that Fedora's word should be so readily accepted, without any further evidence. Skeptics such as CIA counterintelligence chief James J. Angleton had long regarded the Russian as an agent provocateur. But the White House wasn't listening.
"This could be a classic case of an agent sowing disruption at the highest levels of government," Hurt suggested in a telephone interview.
Fresh doubts were finally stirred in 1978, primarily about Nosenko but also about Fedora, with the publication of a book by Edward Jay Epstein called "Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald." It questioned the loyalty of both Russians. Subsequent investigation by the House Assassinations Committee showed that Nosenko had also lied about Lee Harvey Oswald and made other claims concerning the Kennedy assassination that even CIA officials found "incredible."
Nosenko had insisted, for instance, that the KGB had never even interviewed Oswald during his stay in the Soviet Union, much less recruited him as an agent. He also once denied any KGB physical and technical surveillance of Oswald in Russia, but later conceded that Oswald's file was crammed with surveillance reports.
The CIA, however, stuck by Nosenko in an unusual Sept. 21, 1978, public statement calling him "a well-adjusted American citizen utilized as a consultant by CIA and . . . making a valuable contribution to our mission."
But the FBI, meanwhile, undertook a fresh assessment of Fedora. He had reportedly returned by then to the Soviet Union, but files are kept in such cases of all the information supplied by such spies, including details on what proved to be true and what proved not to be true.
"Whenever you have an individual who claims to be a defector, you always have a question about his bona fides -- always," said one official familiar with the process. "You can say for 15 years that someone's great, but that doesn't take care of the 16th year. You've got to be constantly evaluating. For instance, if you have a defector in 1975 and one in 1970, you ask the one who comes in in l975 about what was happening in 1970."
The FBI's secret conclusion, reached in 1980, was that Fedora had been loyal to the KGB all along, including, Hurt emphasized, "the period when he was giving urgent support to Nosenko." But the intelligence community, Hurt said, has yet to undertake a re-examination of such related cases and sources.
Across the river, at Langley, the CIA had nothing new to say.
"It is our policy not to make public comment on such intelligence matters," said CIA spokesman Dale Peterson. "CIA's statement on Nosenko in 1978, however, stands."
Guess what? The Washington Post will never tell you that the story that made The Post (now a major motion picture starring Tom Hanks) involved Russian Collusion.
And whom did the president appoint as Deputy Director of CIA after this 1981 story?
"He served as Deputy Director for Operations from January 11, 1978, to April 12, 1981, and later, nominated by US President Ronald Reagan, as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence under Director William J. Casey as of April 27, 1982, succeeding Bobby Ray Inman. Questioning [him] during his nomination included US Senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan (who guided publication of the VENONA papers in the mid-1990s)."
Oh no, there was a leak. Many of them. The Pentagon Papers were a militarily pointless leak but a politically useful one for the KGB whilst also -- and most importantly -- a diversion from leaks more directly significant.
See, e.g.,
John Dean Papers given to Lenzner [who's son is now CoS to FBI Director Wray] and Armstrong July 31, 1973
INVENTORY
"Dept. of State Telegram fr; Newman, Bangkok, to (Stan Cloud of Time
had access to Class. portions of.Moose-Lowenstein Rept.) - Leaks"
Dear Riddler,
Does your belief that Democratic Senator Patrick Moynihan, and/or Deputy Director of the CIA, John N. McMahon, were KGB "moles" or bad guys have anything to do with your being a fervid supporter of Donald J. Trump and a self-described 1/6 participant?
Your Mentor,
-- Tom
Dear Riddler,
This "thread" is about the occasionally misinformed espionage writer known as Joe Trento and how he correctly reported in 1978 that the FBI had finally (correctly) determined that Hoover's shielded-from-CIA source, FEDORA, was actually a KGB-controlled triple agent who, among other things, had misled Hoover and Nixon into believing that the Kremlin had a *complete* set of the Pentagon Papers, which disinformation led to Nixon's forming The Plumbers Group (to determine the source of the leak), and which counterintelligence-kinda-search eventually led to the Watergate Break-In (involving someone whom John M. Newman claims, based on other evidence, was a KGB "mole" -- James McCord) and to Nixon's downfall.
Question: Can you prove that the Kremlin received a *complete* set of the multi-volume "Pentagon Papers" before The Washington Post (or was it The N.Y. Times?) published its shocking excerpts and analyses?
Your Mentor,
-- Tom
Did IMEMO have Pentagon Papers prior to NYT/WaPo publication on June 13, 1971?
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP73B00296R000300190081-0.pdf
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/WATERGATE%20FILE%20REVIEW%20FIN%5B15816481%5D.pdf
For your further reading ...
"Clearly electoral considerations are now believed to have a significant influence on U.S. foreign policy. This factor, according to Pakhomov, played a key role in the passage by the Congress of the Tunney Amendment which cut off U.S. military aid to Angola. The fact that 1976 was an election year, he writes, a period "when public opinion is of 'great significance' for the politicians" had "a serious influence on the decision adopted by the legislators."[97] Soviet analysts have apparently learned that, whatever the teachings of Party doctrine, the formal requirement of winning periodic elections can and often does affect the behavior of U.S. government officials.Elections, however, are not the only channel through which public opinion can make its influence felt. As the institute's Deputy Director, V. V. Zhurkin has recently observed, "the public . . . has no few opportunities to exert a sobering influence" on U.S. foreign policy. "This was very graphically revealed," he notes, "during the mass movement against aggression in Vietnam which unfolded in the United States during the late sixties and early seventies."[98]The anti-war movement, writes Zhurkin, had a major impact on American political life. "This was, in terms of scale, the most powerful campaign for stopping aggression in the history of the United States."[99] It united practically all the major anti-war organizations into a broad public front and directed their activity toward one goal—ending the war. It successfully coordinated its efforts with anti-war campaigns in other countries. Further, it developed many new "means of struggle"—"the "teach-in," the "sit-in," mass burnings of draft cards, boycotts of corporations which "profitted" from the war, etc. As a result of these efforts, the anti-war campaign was by 1967–68 transformed into a nationwide movement. Between 1969 and 1971 millions participated in mass protests against U.S. "interventional" policies in Southeast Asia.[100]These nationwide demonstrations, notes Zhurkin, had a profound effect on the American government. They "gave rise to growing anxiety" within U.S. leadership circles and "split their ranks." Further, "they prodded Congress into putting forth more decisive demands to stop the war and compelled official Washington to maneuver, to seek a compromise." The Pentagon Papers , suggests Zhurkin, provides evidence from "the inside" which shows "how in practice the anti-war movement exerted influence on the leadership of the military and the whole U.S. state machine." As the authors of the report indicate, "unhappiness with the war" and the growth of "public criticism" generated doubts within the government as to the wisdom of military escalation in Vietnam. Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, notes Zhurkin, in a secret memorandum of February 1968, "warned that continued escalation will lead to 'growing dissatisfaction,' 'evasion of military service and disorder in the cities' and in the end could lead to an 'internal crisis of unprecedented proportions.'" The contents of these secret documents, writes Zhurkin, "graphically demonstrate how powerful and effective was the pressure of social forces on the government."[101]Thus it was fear of public indignation, he argues, which "forced" leading government officials to modify their policies. Not only did such public pressure compel President Johnson to quit the American political arena, and President Nixon to withdraw U.S. forces from Indochina and finally in January 1973 to sign the Paris Peace Agreement. It was dread of a new wave of public protest which, according to Zhurkin, deterred Washington from again resorting to force when in the fall of 1975 the Saigon regime in South Vietnam collapsed.[102]"
...
"In light of its "constructive and businesslike approach" to the Soviet Union, the Nixon administration won recognition, in Arbatov's phrase, as an "acceptable partner."[109] The perspicacity and judiciousness of its leadership was—and continues to be—applauded. Thus, in an article in the main theoretical journal of the Soviet Communist Party, IMEMO Director Nikolai Inozemtsev gives "due credit . . . to a number of eminent state leaders of the capitalist world" who have recognized the dangers of "continuing the cold war and the harsh confrontation with the socialist countries" and "agreed to definite compromises" with them "in the interests of maintaining peace."[110] For Soviet spokesmen this is clearly the cardinal issue. Whatever their specific attitude to particular issues, the "realism" of American policy makers, that is to say their willingness to accept the "legitimacy," "viability" and "full equality" of the USSR, is an absolute prerequisite to "normal" relations."
Soviet Perceptions of the United States Morton Schwartz UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS Berkeley · Los Angeles · Oxford© 1980 The Regents of the University of California
https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft9j49p370;chunk.id=0;doc.view=print
Kulish, V. M., ed.. Military Force and International Relations, International Relations Publishing House, Moscow, 1972 (JPRS-589475/8/73).
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA181614.pdf (Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the Power Projection Mission, Francis Fukuyama 1987)
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973MOSCOW02561_b.html
https://time.com/archive/6715277/soviet-union-key-players-in-a-new-game/
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP77-00432R000100110001-4.pdf pp. 1-9 esp.
https://dokumen.pub/qdownload/the-inconvenient-journalist-a-memoir-9781501759109.html Chap 4
Dear Riddler,
16 April 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Pentagon Papers to the Soviet Embassy
l. On 12 April, I reviewed SB/[deleted] holdings (news clips and Agency memoranda) on the alleged delivery of the Pentagon papers (sic) to the Soviet Embassy in Washington. None of these papers are SB [Soviet Bloc] originated documents, but they show that:
a. On 4 June 1971 Chief SB [David E. Murphy] reviewed the clips and the related memoranda.
b. A blind memorandum (possibly prepared by CI Staff) bears the handwritten notation, "1 July 1971, written for the DCI's briefing book." It describes the FBI source and background to the report.
. . . . . . .
My comment: That "FBI source" was triple-agent KGB Major Aleksei Kulak (Hoover's shielded-from-CIA FEDORA) whom General Gribanov had sent to the FBI's NYC field office in early 1962 to "volunteer" to spy for it at the U.N. and who had misled the CIA and the FBI into believing that KGB Colonel Valery Kostikov (perhaps you've heard of him?) at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City was the head of KGB assassinations and sabotage in the Western Hemisphere.
Your Mentor,
-- Tom
I was more interested in Dimitri Simes' report, on p. 4.
"At a date that [SIMES] can no longer remember, Aleksandr Rodionovich BRYCHKOV (201-0809408) (Senior Research Fellow, Section of Political Problems of the Anti- monopoly Struggle at IMEMO) IMEMO's Division of International Relations, headed by Vasiliy Mikhaylovich KULISH (201-0864696), was analyzing "very important" American papers.
2. Sometime thereafter, when Jack ANDERSON began the public exposure of the Pentagon Papers and the New York Times began publishing them, Stepan Stepanovich SALICHEV (at that time the head of BRYCHKOV's Section of Political Problems of the Antimonopoly Struggle), "we (IMEMO) were well prepared" before the Times commenced publication. That remark led to speculate that it was the Pentagon Papers that the KULISH group was analyzing.
Dear Riddler,
You left out a multi-word redaction between ". . . Struggle at IMEMO)" and "IMEMO's Division of International Relations . . ."
Your Mentor,
-- Tom
[Sergo Mikoyan] see p. 3, top. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP73B00296R000300190081-0.pdf
See also, beg at 243, https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/Watching-the-Bear-Essays-on-CIAs-Analysis-of-the-Soviet-Union-1.pdf
Sergo Mikoyan, The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis: Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Missiles of November (Stanford: Stanford University Press/Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012).
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00608R000200010006-4.pdf
"Red Hawks" -- The Soviet Neo-Cons, counterparts to the Jackson-Moynihan wing in the Dem Party.
Dear Riddler,
Doesn't Sergo know that, as indicated by Nosenko's questioning Tennent H. Bagley and George Kisevalter about an ostensible Indonesia military attaché by the name of "Zepp" in June 1962, Penkovsky was betrayed (IMHO by CIA's Kisevalter or Leonard V. McCoy, or MI5's Roger Hollis) within two weeks of his recruitment by the CIA and MI6 in April of 1961?
(You can read about "The Zepp Incident" in my Wikipedia article on Bagley and in the edited-by-me article on Yuri Nosenko.)
Your Mentor,
-- Tom
I don't know what Sergo knew. I do know that you cannot write coherently. Is this you?
"The "Zepp" Incident
Former high-level CIA counterintelligence officer Tennent H. Bagley wrote in his 2007 Yale University Press book, "Spy Wars: Moles Mysteries and Deadly Games," that Penkovsky's treason was detected by the KGB within two weeks of his April 1961 recruitment by the CIA and MI6. Bagley says that after this detection, Penkovsky was allowed by the KGB to continue spying for the U.S. and Britain for sixteen more months while a scenario was created in which he could be arrested and charged in such a way that would not reveal who, in Western Intelligence, had betrayed him. Bagley based his conclusion on the fact that, when Greville Wynne and Penkovsky were arrested, and imprisoned in Russia, Wynne was confronted with a tape recording of a conversation he had had with Penkovsky in a Moscow restaurant two weeks after his recruitment. In this recording, Wynne asked Penkovsky, "How's Zeph?" When Wynne was asked by his KGB interrogator who this "Zepp" (sic) was, he recalled that "Zeph" was the nickname of a London bargirl by the name of Stephanie, whom Penkovsky and Wynne had met while Penkovsky was being recruited. Bagley points out in his book that while he and George Kisevalter were interviewing KGB defector Yuri Nosenko in June 1962, Nosenko, while bragging about the KGB's secret recording devices, asked them who "Zepp" (sic) was, volunteering that it was the name of an Indonesian military attaché unknown to the KGB, whose conversation with U.S. military attaché Leo Dulacki was allegedly secretly recorded in a Moscow restaurant. The fact that Nosenko asked Bagley and Kisevalter this question was one of the reasons Bagley came to conclude that Nosenko was a false defector, and also made him realize that a "mole" in the CIA or British intelligence had betrayed Penkovsky immediately after his recruitment."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oleg_Penkovsky#The_%22Zepp%22_Incident
All of this is meaningless. The point, my point, was that in response to your observation about the additional redaction, the redacted portion would lead to Mikoyan and then on to the Mole issue. All of your contorted bloviating speculations are neither here nor there. We both agree that persons were given up. Your parenthetical conclusions aside, you have nothing.
You need to undertake an English writing course. You cannot write. To wit:
"Bagley points out in his book that while he and George Kisevalter were interviewing KGB defector Yuri Nosenko in June 1962, Nosenko, while bragging about the KGB's secret recording devices, asked them who "Zepp" (sic) was, volunteering that it was the name of an Indonesian military attaché unknown to the KGB, whose conversation with U.S. military attaché Leo Dulacki was allegedly secretly recorded in a Moscow restaurant. The fact that Nosenko asked Bagley and Kisevalter this question was one of the reasons Bagley came to conclude that Nosenko was a false defector, and also made him realize that a "mole" in the CIA or British intelligence had betrayed Penkovsky immediately after his recruitment."
You don't even make your own case.
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 45 No. 5 (2001)
Eroding the Soviet “Culture of Secrecy”
By Sergo A. Mikoyan
Western Winds Behind Kremlin Walls
Editor’s Note: This article was adapted from a paper that the author prepared for a symposium at Princeton University titled “CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991.” The symposium, held in March 2001, was sponsored by the Center of International Studies at Princeton and the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence.
The main purpose of this article is to examine the system that governed
the flow of information to senior policymakers in the USSR. Fundamental cultural differences between the Soviet and Western worlds have impeded efforts by Westerners to fully understand this system. It is much easier for those who were born and educated in the Soviet Union, and have spent much of their lives there, to comprehend the main features that dominated the upward flow of information in that now-defunct nation.
Culture of Secrecy
The “culture of secrecy,” a phrase used by former Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan in discussing US intelligence institutions, is actually what I would call a perfect characterization of the old Soviet Union’s attitude toward information.
https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/Eroding-the-Soviet-Culture.pdf
Dear Riddler,
If you have an unredacted copy of the memo, why didn't you post it originally?
Your Mentor,
-- Tom
I don't permit myself to violate classification policy.
Moreover, you are are constantly under test by me. You don't seem to get this. I throw in gold and chicken feed together, and watch as you gobble up the dust.
Dear Riddler,
Superb rationalization.
Your Mentor,
-- Tom
Dear Riddler,
Why in the world would you lend Dimitri Simes any credence?
Because he's a supporter of Donald Trump?
Your Mentor,
-- Tom
The claim is valid. Pentagon Papers in Moscow before publication here.
KGB wanted Nixon to go bonkers over the Pentagon Papers.
https://www.carnegie.org/awards/honoree/dimitri-simes/
2013 GREAT IMMIGRANTS
Dimitri Simes
President and CEO, The Center for the National Interest
Born in: Russia
Dimitri Simes
Dimitri Simes was born in 1947 in Moscow in the former Soviet Union and graduated from Moscow University. Though he served as an analyst of international affairs at the IMEMO institute, he decided to immigrate to the U.S. in 1973. Here he was able to write insightfully about the Soviet government that he knew firsthand, including its foreign policies. This authority made him invaluable as an informal foreign policy advisor to President Nixon with whom he traveled to Moscow around the fall of the Soviet Union. Since then Simes has served as President of the Nixon Center and is currently president and CEO of the Center for the National Interest. He is the author of After the Collapse: Russia Seeks Its Place as a Great Power and has lectured at the University of California Berkeley and Columbia University.
Is the fact that your boy Simes was mentioned more than a hundred times in the Mueller Report just an example of the “Deep State” / “Administrative State” in action?
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-08-28/msnbc-host-retracts-story-trump-russia-finanaces
O’Donnell has been hosting “The Last Word” since 2010 and has been an MSNBC analyst since 1996. The Harvard graduate was an aide to the late New York Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan and an executive producer on the NBC entertainment series “The West Wing.”
The Washington Post
Headline:
"FBI Says Its Spy in KGB Was a Fake; FBI Thinks Its KGB Spy Was Always on Soviets' Side"
By George Lardner Jr
September 3, 1981 at 1:00 a.m. EDT
My comments are in brackets.
. . . . . . .
When the Nixon administration was in court a decade ago in an effort to cut off publication of the Pentagon Papers, the White House was told that a complete set of the top-secret documents had been delivered to the Soviet Embassy.
The FBI and the Nixon White House were evidently convinced that the report was accurate. It had come from "Fedora" [KGB Major Aleksei Kulak], a strategically placed KGB officer whom the FBI had been relying upon for years as a trusted counterspy.
The information he provided in this instance helped prompt formation of the infamous "White House plumbers" unit whose operatives later carried out the Watergate break-in. President Nixon's efforts to curtail the Watergate investigations were said to have been motivated in part by fears that "Fedora" would be exposed.
It might have been better if he had been. The FBI is now convinced that "Fedora" was a Soviet agent, acting under Moscow's control during all the years he fed information to the bureau.
The startling new assessment of "Fedora," until now a closely held secret, is disclosed in a forthcoming article in the October Reader's Digest and has been confirmed independently by The Washington Post.
The secret conclusion was based "to some degree, on new information," said one official familiar with the FBI's counterespionage effort. "It's an incredible business . . . an incredible chess game that you have to play."
The new finding about Fedora, who was stationed at the United Nations as a Soviet diplomat, also raises unsettling questions about the credentials of other supposed Soviet defectors, especially those whose stories Fedora backed up.
"If one falls, others must fall," contends the Digest article by roving editor Henry Hurt, "creating havoc inside intelligence services where crucial analyses and long-term plans may have been built upon the supposed reliability of these sources."
The case has all sorts of permutations. Much of the fallout concerns Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, a onetime [putative] KGB officer who has been a bone of contention since he defected to this country in 1964 with claims that he had been in charge of the KGB file on President Kennedy's assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald.
[False defector] Nosenko, who first offered to spy ["in-place" in Moscow] for the United States in 1962 [but who was really sent to the CIA in Geneva to discredit what a recant true defector, KGB Major Anatoliy Golitsyn, was telling the CIA, and who, regardless, told the CIA to not try to contact him in Moscow], had once said he would never defect, but then told his CIA contacts in Geneva in 1964 that he had to defect at once because he had received a cable [he hadn't] from Moscow recalling him. He said he was afraid the KGB had learned of his contacts with the CIA.
From his post within the Soviet apparatus at the U.N., Fedora offered confirmation, telling the FBI that Nosenko had indeed been sent a recall telegram.
Nosenko also claimed to have been a lieutenant colonel in the KGB. Fedora, who had been providing information to the FBI since 1962, confirmed that claim, too.
Subsequently, however, Nosenko acknowledged under hostile questioning by CIA officers that his talk of a recall telegram had been a lie and so was his claim of colonel's rank. He had been only a KGB captain and had lied, he said, to exaggerate his importance.
Before long, Nosenko found himself imprisoned by the CIA for some five years, three of them in solitary confinement [I'm sobbing uncontrollably], but he never broke down [he came really, really close one time] and was finally rehabilitated [sic; "cleared" by probable KGB "mole" Bruce Solie via a bogus polygraph exam and a specious report] in 1968. He became a consultant for the agency, collecting some $500,000 over the next decade in consultant salaries, bonuses, resettlement expenses and other payments [gag me with a KGB spoon].
Fedora, by contrast, appears to have had nothing but smooth sailing with the FBI despite his corroboration of Nosenko's admitted lies.
"When we started up with Fedora, the bureau held very strong views that he was legit," one former intelligence official recalled yesterday. "Of course there was a minority that felt the other way, but not many."
Much of what Fedora said over the years was, in turn, conveyed directly to the White House, enhancing his position, sources said. "There is no question the information would always go to the highest levels," said one expert. "That gave it a great deal of prominence."
By the time of the Pentagon Papers incident in 1971, editor Hurt said in a telephone interview, Fedora was "regarded as a knight in shining armor. And he was telling the FBI which was telling Nixon that a copy of the Pentagon Papers had been delivered to the Soviet Embassy. Nixon & Co. accepted the report without question."
In fact, word of the alleged delivery was quickly published by a conservative columnist with close ties to the White House while the Pentagon Papers case was still before the Supreme Court. Some critics regarded it as a White House effort to influence the court's decision, albeit an unsuccessful one.
In any case, according to a Dec. 9, 1973, New York Times article, President Nixon developed fears, reportedly nourished by his then-national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger, that Daniel Ellsberg, the man who had leaked the Pentagon Papers to the press, might have provided the Soviets with far more important secrets, especially concerning nuclear targeting plans.
Some intelligence officials were reportedly stunned that Fedora's word should be so readily accepted, without any further evidence. Skeptics such as CIA counterintelligence chief James J. Angleton had long regarded the Russian as an agent provocateur. But the White House wasn't listening.
"This could be a classic case of an agent sowing disruption at the highest levels of government," Hurt suggested in a telephone interview.
Fresh doubts were finally stirred in 1978, primarily about Nosenko but also about Fedora, with the publication of a book by Edward Jay Epstein called "Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald." It questioned the loyalty of both Russians. Subsequent investigation by the House Assassinations Committee showed that Nosenko had also lied about Lee Harvey Oswald and made other claims concerning the Kennedy assassination that even CIA officials found "incredible."
Nosenko had insisted, for instance, that the KGB had never even interviewed Oswald during his stay in the Soviet Union, much less recruited him as an agent. He also once denied any KGB physical and technical surveillance of Oswald in Russia, but later conceded that Oswald's file was crammed with surveillance reports.
The CIA, however, stuck by Nosenko in an unusual Sept. 21, 1978, public statement calling him "a well-adjusted American citizen utilized as a consultant by CIA and . . . making a valuable contribution to our mission."
But the FBI, meanwhile, undertook a fresh assessment of Fedora. He had reportedly returned by then to the Soviet Union, but files are kept in such cases of all the information supplied by such spies, including details on what proved to be true and what proved not to be true.
"Whenever you have an individual who claims to be a defector, you always have a question about his bona fides -- always," said one official familiar with the process. "You can say for 15 years that someone's great, but that doesn't take care of the 16th year. You've got to be constantly evaluating. For instance, if you have a defector in 1975 and one in 1970, you ask the one who comes in in l975 about what was happening in 1970."
The FBI's secret conclusion, reached in 1980, was that Fedora had been loyal to the KGB all along, including, Hurt emphasized, "the period when he was giving urgent support to Nosenko." But the intelligence community, Hurt said, has yet to undertake a re-examination of such related cases and sources.
Across the river, at Langley, the CIA had nothing new to say.
"It is our policy not to make public comment on such intelligence matters," said CIA spokesman Dale Peterson. "CIA's statement on Nosenko in 1978, however, stands."
Guess what? The Washington Post will never tell you that the story that made The Post (now a major motion picture starring Tom Hanks) involved Russian Collusion.
And whom did the president appoint as Deputy Director of CIA after this 1981 story?
"He served as Deputy Director for Operations from January 11, 1978, to April 12, 1981, and later, nominated by US President Ronald Reagan, as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence under Director William J. Casey as of April 27, 1982, succeeding Bobby Ray Inman. Questioning [him] during his nomination included US Senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan (who guided publication of the VENONA papers in the mid-1990s)."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_N._McMahon
Dear Riddler,
Gee, his "credentials" are almost as impressive as those of Nosenko-and-Yurchenko-loving / Bagley-despising Oleg Kalugin!
Your Mentor,
-- Tom
Dear Riddler,
Moscow didn't have a complete copy, but FEDORA misled Hoover and Nixon into believing it did.
Nixon went bonkers anyway and set up The Plumbers to try to find the non-existent "leak."
Your Mentor,
-- Tom
Oh no, there was a leak. Many of them. The Pentagon Papers were a militarily pointless leak but a politically useful one for the KGB whilst also -- and most importantly -- a diversion from leaks more directly significant.
See, e.g.,
John Dean Papers given to Lenzner [who's son is now CoS to FBI Director Wray] and Armstrong July 31, 1973
INVENTORY
"Dept. of State Telegram fr; Newman, Bangkok, to (Stan Cloud of Time
had access to Class. portions of.Moose-Lowenstein Rept.) - Leaks"
https://shepardonwatergate.com/documents/RN023.pdf p. 284