I have never heard of Angleton being Solie's subordinate. Angleton was Chief of CI and Solie of the Office of Security. Different departments, different roles. What's the basis for your assertion please? If anything, the opposite is more in line with my reading of the Angleton / Helms / JFKA literature.
I’m in the process of typing out a page from Newman’s “Uncovering Popov’s Mole” for you. Seein’ as how I’m a “hunt and peck” typist, it could take a while.
Between 1951 and 1963, the number of Office of Security (OS) personnel increased from 35 to 700. By 1959, the Office of Security had become a sprawling organization with numerous components. Many of them would have something to provide to the mole hunt, but ultimately the director and deputy director of OS, Sheffield Edwards and Robert L. Bannerman, would decide where the nerve center of the activity and responsibility would reside. In 1959, OS had six staff-level components sitting above the division and office level elements. These six staffs that were reporting directly to the director and deputy director included Inspection, Foreign Support, Administration and Training, Policy, Alien Affairs, and SECURITY RESEARCH. [emphasis in original] In a 1994 interview, former Deputy Director Bannerman said that the Security Research Staff (SRS) was under his personal supervision and was the principal action element in the mole hunt. The chief of SRS, Paul Gaynor, was up to his eyeballs in the quick expansion of top-secret OS programs such as Bluebird and Artichoke to extract information from Communists by scrambling their brains through electric shocks, drugs, and hypnotism. Crucially, Gaynor left the designing of the mole hunt to the chief of his Research Branch (RB). At that time the section chief was Bruce Solie. It was the SRS that dealt with Angleton’s CI Staff on a close basis, so he was the right person in the right place and at the right time into whose hands control of the mole hunt fell. Solie, not Angleton, was the “wizard behind the curtain,” directing as he saw fit the hunt for the KGB [“Popov’s U-2 Mole” / “Popov’s Mole”] mole in the CIA, and so it has been a mistake to describe the hunt, as I (and others) did for many years as “The Angleton Mole Hunt.” The idea behind that phrase is to use a false defector in a genuine effort to surface the mole. It failed. To understand why, we must look to the future for the evidence. For nine years Solie continued to convince Angleton that the mole was located in SRD, the largest division in the Directorate of Plans (DDP). In retrospect, with the luxury of looking back from 1967, one of the first suspicions that comes to mind is that the mole was not in SRD. If that was the case for all of those years, it follows that looking only in that location might have been a misdirection. Such a remarkably long failure of the CIA’s mole hunt suggests that it was a false mole hunt all along. That prospective renders most of what we thought we know about the battle of the Cold War spy services is obsolete.
[…]
CIA document registers clearly reveal that all incoming messages and cables on [Oswald’s defection] from other government agencies did not go to where they normally would -- the Soviet Russia Division (SRD) All of those incoming messages and cables were shunted off to the Office of Security (OS) by the Office of Mail Logistics (OL) and Records Integration Division. OS then decided what to share or not share with [Angleton’s] CI Staff in the false mole hunt scenario. The claim that the mole was in SRD was a deliberate falsehood to confuse and misdirect Angleton. The idea of pinning down Angleton's focus in the wrong place for as long as possible might have been done to buy time during the eight-year unfolding of scorched earth warfare over the bona fides of Yuri Nosenko. It was a battle between, on one side, the CI Staff and SRD that became increasingly important. On the other side of the battlefield the tiny but powerful rogue element in OS increasingly attracted allies [like Leonard V. McCoy, Richard Kovich, George Kisevalter and Katharine Colvin Hart] in SRD while secretly planning to destroy the leadership of the SRD.
[…]
For years, Solie continued to confuse Angleton. In 1966, Solie told Angleton that a new bona fide KGB defector, Igor Kochnov, could ferret out the mole who was spinning a poisonous web of treachery deep within the CIA. Much later, after it was too late, Angleton would realize that Kochnov had not been a bona fide defector and had been a provocation all along. [Actually, Angleton suspected Kochnov a “plant” from the very beginning and wanted to “play” him back against the KGB but mistakenly believing that the mole was in the SRD, he unfortunately chose Solie from the OS to handle him.] In chapter 8 we'll discuss Kochnov and his alluring KITTY HAWK operation. Oswald's declassified CIA records exposed the subversion of the normal internal distribution of Oswald’s CIA files that occurred during and after his 1959 defection in Moscow (and in 1960 – 1961) and similarly occurred again during his 1963 visit to Mexico City. What was happening in Moscow in 1959 was the launching of a mole hunt by dangling Oswald as “bait.” What was happening in Mexico City in September-October 1963 was the continuation of the mole hunt by tangling Oswald again, this time as poison to frame Oswald, Castro, and Khrushchev in the impending death of JFK. It is commonly assumed, as I did for years, that what both scenarios have in common is the hunt for a mole by Angleton’s CI/Staff, but as discussed above, the principal component in 1959 was the CIA's Office of Security. Robert Bannerman, the OS deputy chief at the time, told me in a 1994 interview quote, “Angleton was in on this.” Although Bannerman emphasized OS cooperation with Angleton’s staff “and others,” that should not be taken to mean Angleton had the lead. Being in on an operation means as a participant, not the office of primary concern. “We were calling in all the people in all the areas,” Bannerman explained, “who might have something.” As to which people in OS were involved, Bannerman recalled, “We had a certain amount, most of my staff., Bannerman replied. He emphasized that Paul Gaynor on his staff was one who “was very active in handling that end of the business, along with Bruce Solie.”
One other remark puzzles me: "[Solie] sent, or duped his confidant, protégé, and mole-hunting subordinate, James Angleton, into sending, Lee Harvey Oswald to Moscow." I have never heard of the OS or the CI Staff running agents abroad. Am I mistaken in this view too?
I have never heard of Angleton being Solie's subordinate. Angleton was Chief of CI and Solie of the Office of Security. Different departments, different roles. What's the basis for your assertion please? If anything, the opposite is more in line with my reading of the Angleton / Helms / JFKA literature.
That’s what I used to think, too.
So what changed your mind?
I’m in the process of typing out a page from Newman’s “Uncovering Popov’s Mole” for you. Seein’ as how I’m a “hunt and peck” typist, it could take a while.
No need, just give me the page number. I have the book.
Between 1951 and 1963, the number of Office of Security (OS) personnel increased from 35 to 700. By 1959, the Office of Security had become a sprawling organization with numerous components. Many of them would have something to provide to the mole hunt, but ultimately the director and deputy director of OS, Sheffield Edwards and Robert L. Bannerman, would decide where the nerve center of the activity and responsibility would reside. In 1959, OS had six staff-level components sitting above the division and office level elements. These six staffs that were reporting directly to the director and deputy director included Inspection, Foreign Support, Administration and Training, Policy, Alien Affairs, and SECURITY RESEARCH. [emphasis in original] In a 1994 interview, former Deputy Director Bannerman said that the Security Research Staff (SRS) was under his personal supervision and was the principal action element in the mole hunt. The chief of SRS, Paul Gaynor, was up to his eyeballs in the quick expansion of top-secret OS programs such as Bluebird and Artichoke to extract information from Communists by scrambling their brains through electric shocks, drugs, and hypnotism. Crucially, Gaynor left the designing of the mole hunt to the chief of his Research Branch (RB). At that time the section chief was Bruce Solie. It was the SRS that dealt with Angleton’s CI Staff on a close basis, so he was the right person in the right place and at the right time into whose hands control of the mole hunt fell. Solie, not Angleton, was the “wizard behind the curtain,” directing as he saw fit the hunt for the KGB [“Popov’s U-2 Mole” / “Popov’s Mole”] mole in the CIA, and so it has been a mistake to describe the hunt, as I (and others) did for many years as “The Angleton Mole Hunt.” The idea behind that phrase is to use a false defector in a genuine effort to surface the mole. It failed. To understand why, we must look to the future for the evidence. For nine years Solie continued to convince Angleton that the mole was located in SRD, the largest division in the Directorate of Plans (DDP). In retrospect, with the luxury of looking back from 1967, one of the first suspicions that comes to mind is that the mole was not in SRD. If that was the case for all of those years, it follows that looking only in that location might have been a misdirection. Such a remarkably long failure of the CIA’s mole hunt suggests that it was a false mole hunt all along. That prospective renders most of what we thought we know about the battle of the Cold War spy services is obsolete.
[…]
CIA document registers clearly reveal that all incoming messages and cables on [Oswald’s defection] from other government agencies did not go to where they normally would -- the Soviet Russia Division (SRD) All of those incoming messages and cables were shunted off to the Office of Security (OS) by the Office of Mail Logistics (OL) and Records Integration Division. OS then decided what to share or not share with [Angleton’s] CI Staff in the false mole hunt scenario. The claim that the mole was in SRD was a deliberate falsehood to confuse and misdirect Angleton. The idea of pinning down Angleton's focus in the wrong place for as long as possible might have been done to buy time during the eight-year unfolding of scorched earth warfare over the bona fides of Yuri Nosenko. It was a battle between, on one side, the CI Staff and SRD that became increasingly important. On the other side of the battlefield the tiny but powerful rogue element in OS increasingly attracted allies [like Leonard V. McCoy, Richard Kovich, George Kisevalter and Katharine Colvin Hart] in SRD while secretly planning to destroy the leadership of the SRD.
[…]
For years, Solie continued to confuse Angleton. In 1966, Solie told Angleton that a new bona fide KGB defector, Igor Kochnov, could ferret out the mole who was spinning a poisonous web of treachery deep within the CIA. Much later, after it was too late, Angleton would realize that Kochnov had not been a bona fide defector and had been a provocation all along. [Actually, Angleton suspected Kochnov a “plant” from the very beginning and wanted to “play” him back against the KGB but mistakenly believing that the mole was in the SRD, he unfortunately chose Solie from the OS to handle him.] In chapter 8 we'll discuss Kochnov and his alluring KITTY HAWK operation. Oswald's declassified CIA records exposed the subversion of the normal internal distribution of Oswald’s CIA files that occurred during and after his 1959 defection in Moscow (and in 1960 – 1961) and similarly occurred again during his 1963 visit to Mexico City. What was happening in Moscow in 1959 was the launching of a mole hunt by dangling Oswald as “bait.” What was happening in Mexico City in September-October 1963 was the continuation of the mole hunt by tangling Oswald again, this time as poison to frame Oswald, Castro, and Khrushchev in the impending death of JFK. It is commonly assumed, as I did for years, that what both scenarios have in common is the hunt for a mole by Angleton’s CI/Staff, but as discussed above, the principal component in 1959 was the CIA's Office of Security. Robert Bannerman, the OS deputy chief at the time, told me in a 1994 interview quote, “Angleton was in on this.” Although Bannerman emphasized OS cooperation with Angleton’s staff “and others,” that should not be taken to mean Angleton had the lead. Being in on an operation means as a participant, not the office of primary concern. “We were calling in all the people in all the areas,” Bannerman explained, “who might have something.” As to which people in OS were involved, Bannerman recalled, “We had a certain amount, most of my staff., Bannerman replied. He emphasized that Paul Gaynor on his staff was one who “was very active in handling that end of the business, along with Bruce Solie.”
[I could go on and on . . .]
One other remark puzzles me: "[Solie] sent, or duped his confidant, protégé, and mole-hunting subordinate, James Angleton, into sending, Lee Harvey Oswald to Moscow." I have never heard of the OS or the CI Staff running agents abroad. Am I mistaken in this view too?